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CONSISTENCY WITH ADOPTED LAND
USE PLANS AS A STANDARD OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE CASE AGAINST
A. DAN TARLOCK*
INTRODUc-TION
Conversion of land from one use to another frequently does not
result from a rational, incremental extension of existing uses into
adjoining areas. The initiative to develop lies with the private prop-
erty owner' and the dynamics of urban and suburban land markets
lead the developer to search for the least expensive available land.2
In most metropolitan areas the resulting growth has been an uneven
spread in all directions. It is conventional wisdom among planners
that allowing private initiative to control the rate, sequence and loca-
*Professor of Law, Indiana University at Bloomington; Visiting Professor of
Law, University of Pennsylvania, 1974-75. A.B. 1962, LL.B. 1965, Stanford
University.
I am indebted to my colleague Professor Jan Z. Krasnowiecki whose insights,
based on long reflection about the problems discussed in the Article, have been
extremely helpful in clarifying my own thinking.
1. See D. MANDELKER, THE ZONING DILEBiMIA 47 (1971).
2. A recent study prepared for the Council on Environmental Quality and the
Department of Housing and Urban Development concludes that for a fixed
number of households, sprawl is the most expensive form of residential develop-
ment in terms of natural resource consumption and economic and personal costs.
REAL ESTATE RESEARCH CORP., THE COSTS OF SPRAWL 6 (1974).
3. For a discussion of the contrast between the growth patterns of the United
States and Great Britain, which has followed a containment policy since World
War II, see M. CLAWSON & P. HALL, PLANNING AND URBAN GROWTH 9-18
/ 1973).
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tion of development forecloses certain land uses before a reasonable
range of alternative allocations can be considered.4
All levels of government encourage this developmental pattern
through subsidies to private development and minimal regulation of
private location choices. The interstate highway system increased
access and thereby opened most metropolitan areas to growth. Utili-
ties are not used to control development, but rather are extended in
response to it.5 Historically, government land use regulation has
protected the established landowner through techniques, such as sub-
division regulations and zoning districts, that preclude uses adversely
affecting the existing, and therefore preferred, use. Public ownership
is confined to land necessary for governmental uses and public recrea-
tion facilities. Land banking, with subsequent sale or lease for projects
consistent with public plans, is not widely employed. Parcels as-
sembled for urban renewal are located in blighted inner city areas
rather than on the suburban-exurban fringe where developmental
pressures occur.
When land is converted from one use to another, application for
an administrative or legislative rezoning provides the major form of
land use regulation. Original zoning theory gave little thought to
methods for changing zoning classifications. It was assumed that cities
would grow by small increments. Thus zoning could rationalize the
development process by recognizing and anticipating market-conferred
values and could stabilize each area by excluding nuisances. 0 This
and related assumptions have, of course, been proved incorrect.
4. See, e.g., REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMM'N ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDINO
THE AMERICAN CITY 222-24 (1968).
5. Public and private services have been priced so that charges "are likely to be
no greater for the distant than for the close-in subdivision." M. OLAWsoN & F.
HALL, supra note 3, at 22-23. For an argument that utility extensions should be
used to control urban growth see Note, Control of the Timing and Location of
Government Utility Extensions, 26 STAN. L. REV. 945, 946-52 (1974).
6. Heyman, Legal Assaults on Municipal Land Use Regulation, 5 URBAN LAW.
1 (1973).
7. There were at least five crucial assumptions upon which the original
system was built. First, a simplistic segregation of uses would result in a
quality urban environment. Second, it would be possible, in drawing the
zoning map, to formulate an intelligent all-at-once decision to which the
market would conform. Third, the governors of the system would rarely
change the rules. Fourth, non-conforming uses would go away. Fifth,
municipal power would accomplish the goals. Most of these have proved
to be wrong.
Id. at 2.
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Since the demise of these assumptions, planners have attempted to
control land use conversion by transforming zoning from a static
system into a process of administrative allocation of land development
opportunities. Cities have refused to make advance allocations, adopt-
ing instead techniques such as establishing holding zones, classifying
all developable land for low density uses, and making the request for
a zoning change the first occasion on which the reasonableness of any
kind of development is considered.8 Planned unit development ordi-
nances and the classification of most major uses as conditional have
injected a broad discretionary element into relatively non-discretionary
systems because they subject changes in zoning to case-by-case review.
These theories of "change management," however, have not pro-
duced acceptable results. Such an administration of re-zonings fails
to further two important national policies-protection and enhance-
ment of environmental quality and the provision of decent housing
at all income levels.9 Furthermore, a sequence of zoning changes too
often results in an inequitable distribution of land development
8. Most recent studies of zoning have criticized the traditional method of ad-
vance allocations of use districts on the ground that it requires localities to make
too many decisions too soon. These studies recommend more flexible policies
such as the use of holding zones and administrative approval so that specific
land uses will not be located until a developer submits an application. See D.
HEETER, TOWARD A MORE EFFECTIVE LAND USE-GUIDANCE SYSTEDI: A Sum-
MkRY AND ANALYSIS or Frvr MAJOR REPORTS 13-14 (1969). These recom-
mendations summarize the strategy many communities are now following through
the use of floating zones, conditional uses, and planned unit development ordi-
nances. By and large the courts have validated the use of these flexible techniques,
hut substantial, unanswered questions impede the use of these strategies to imple-
ment comprehensive plans. For example, can a municipality deny an application
for development that meets the ordinance's standards merely because the com-
munity decides there is no need for the facility? In many jurisdictions this is
not yet a valid ground for denial, but it is increasingly being recognized as such.
See Pioneer Trust & Savings Bank v. County of McHenry, 89 Ill. App. 2d 257,
232 N.E.2d 816 (1967), rev'd, 41 Ill. 2d 77, 241 N.E.2d 454 (1968). Illinois
appellate courts, however, have approved denials of special use permits under ordi-
nances that require a showing of public necessity. See Comment, Illinois Zoning:
Every Use a Special Use, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 340, 349-50. See also Van Sicklen
v. Browne, 15 Cal. App. 3d 122, 92 Cal. Rptr. 786 (Ct. App. 1971); Lucky
Stores, Inc. v. Board of Appeals, 270 Md. 513, 312 A.2d 758 (1973).
9. See A. DOWNS, OPENING UP THE SUBURBS: AN URBAN STRATEGY FOR
AkMERIcA (1973); L. SAGALYN & G. STERNLIEB, ZONING AND HOUSING COSTS
(1973). For a discussion of environmental problems caused by current land use
laws see TAsK FORCE ON LAND USE & URBAN GROWTH, THE USE OF LAND: A
CITIZEN'S POLICY GUIDE TO URBAN GROWTH (W. Reilly ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as TASK FORCE ON LAND USE & URBAN GROWTH].
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opportunities" as well as inefficient land resource allocations." Zoning,
then, too often becomes merely a series of arbitrary, ad hoc choices.
One major proposal for reform in land use regulation is the formal
subordination of zoning to planning, 2 i.e. using zoning only for im-
plementation of choices made in an already existing land use plan. 3
10. "Equitable" is used in the sense in which Professor Michaelman has de-
fined fairness. If decisions are fair, "the disappointed claimant ought to be able
to appreciate how such decisions might fit into a consistent practice which holds
forth lesser long-run risk to people like him than would any consistent practice
which is naturally suggested by the opposite decision." Michaelman, Property,
Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foundations of "Just Compensa-
tion" Law, 80 HLv. L. REv. 1165, 1223 (1967).
11. For a strong defense of the position that markets most efficiently allocate
land uses see B. SIEGAN, LAND USE WITHOUT ZONING (1972). The same con-
clusions are reached in Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHm. L. REv. 681, 682-99 (1973).
12. In addition, two other major reforms have been proposed. The first of
these is impact analysis-a detailed review of the impact of crystallized plans.
The theory of impact analysis is unclear. Apparently it assumes that undesirable
side-effects of a proposed development can best be minimized by imposing rig-
orous conditions on project site selection and construction rather than by exclud-
ing development from the location chosen. See Krasnowiecki, Zoning Litigation
and the New Pennsylvania Procedures, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 1029, 1155-56 (1972);
Cf. MODEL LAND DEv. CODE § 3-101 to -106 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1970). The
Code encourages traditional long-range planning procedures but suggests that
"[these efforts . . . are mainly to provide a framework for a systematized pro-
gram of government action over a relatively short period of time after which the
framework is expected to be readjusted." Id. at 93-94.
The second of these additional reforms is the increased use of land banking. A
community would purchase land in advance of development and dispose of it
consistently with a long-range plan. Recent studies of land use planning have
uniformly recommended land banking. E.g., PRESIDENT'S Co1,0. ON UnaAN
HOUSING, A DECENT HomE 146-47 (1969); REPORT OF THE NAT'L COMIt'N ON
URBAN PROBLEMS, supra note 4, at 251-52. See also Note, Public Land Banking:
A New Praxis for Urban Growth, 23 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 897 (1972), which
analyzes the purposes of land banking and the existing uses of this technique. For
a preview of how a land bank might be administered see Note, Judicial Review of
Land Bank Dispositions, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 377 (1974).
13. See Haar, "In Accordance With A Comprehensive Plan," 68 HARv. L.
Rav. 1154 (1955). A "land use plan" is defined as any formal process, apart
from zoning, that allocates land development opportunities in advance of a specific
request for a zoning change. This definition avoids confusion between a master
plan and the comprehensive land use plan.
The original object of planning was a fixed end-state master plan, with a multi-
colored map indicating, in reasonably detailed fashion, desired or projected
future land uses. Master planning has long been criticized as too rigid. Planners,
therefore, have moved away from specific long-term projections toward flexible
policy statements, often combined with a map indicating, in a less specific man-
[Vol. 9:69
LAND USE PLANS AS A STANDARD OF REVIEW
Such a proposal, in effect, substitutes the planners' market projections
and value preferences for those of profit-motivated land developers.
It assumes that planners have a superior capacity to assemble and
analyze the information necessary to evaluate the long-range conse-
quences of alternative choices.'
ner, the desired and projected locations of major land uses. See D. MANDELKER,
supra note 1, at 60-63.
As a means of controlling land speculation, the flexible approach has the ad-
vantage of keeping developers off-balance and forestalling public opposition, since
gains and losses have not been clearly distributed. For practical purposes, how-
ever, the fixed end-state and flexible approaches both involve advance allocation
of land development opportunities. The difference between them is only one of
degree and is not relevant to the question of the reception courts have given the
requirement that zoning be consistent with some prior planning process.
The term "comprehensive land use plan" is not used since the term "compre-
hensive plan" has come to stand for a variety of concepts, some only vaguely re-
lated to planning. Confusion over the meaning of the term "comprehensive plan"
stems from its use in the Standard State Zoning Enabling Act at a time when no
clear relationship existed between planning theory and the rationale for market
intervention. See text at notes 25-27 infra. Section 3 of the Act provides that
zoning "regulations shall be in accordance with a comprehensive plan." AD-
VISORY COMM. ON CITY PLANNING & ZONING, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, A
STANDARD STATE ZONING ENABLING ACT § 3 (rev. ed. 1926) [hereinafter cited
as SZEA]. The drafters failed to agree on the relationship between the plan
and a zoning ordinance. See T. KENT, THE URBAN GENERAL PLAN 28-38
(1964); note 25 infra. The section, however, has been interpreted to require
only the adoption of a zoning ordinance consistent with the constitutional guaran-
tee of equal protection, rather than the preparation, adoption and implementation
of a master plan separate from the zoning ordinance.
Many cases have required only geographical comprehensiveness on the ground
that if any part of the city is zoned, fairness to landowners requires that all parts
be zoned. See Kozesnik v. Township of Montgomery, 24 N.J. 154, 131 A.2d 1
(1957); Haar, supra, at 1158-59. Even in states with enabling legislation re-
quiring the preparation of a plan, courts have concluded that the zoning ordi-
nance may constitute the plan; changes, therefore, need only meet constitutional
standards. See Hawkins v. City of Richmond . ................ Ind. App .-................
286 NE.2d 682 (1972), construing IND. CODE §§ 18-7-5-3, -37 (1971). The
ALI Model Code, § 2-101(3), allows a unit of government to regulate only part
of its jurisdiction, "relying on constitutional standards to protect against its abuse."
MODEL LAND DEV. CODE § 2-101, at 29 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1970). This is con-
sistent with recent judicial considerations of partial zoning. See Scarborough v.
Mayor & Council, 303 A.2d 701 (Del. Ch. 1973), holding that a county with
authority to zone may rationally decide to exclude incorporated municipalities
from a zoning ordinance.
14. Land banking rests largely on the same assumption, although it makes
planners more responsible for the consequences of their decisions than does the
subordination of zoning to planning. Impact analysis, on the other hand, rejects
the superiority of planners' public information assembly and evaluation and as-
sumes that public intervention can only solve short-run, well-defined problems.
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Until recently there has been little need for courts to analyze the
relationship between planning and the administration of land use
controls because most land use decisions were clearly ad hoc and
planning was not perceived as having an operative impact. This
situation is no longer prevalent. Citizens are successfully demanding
the preparation of land use control plans. Developers and citizen
groups now recognize that community policy is most effectively in-
fluenced by challenging the planning assumptions at the adoption
stage rather than waiting for a focused land use controversy.15
This Article examines the conceptual basis and judicial recognition
of the formal subordination of zoning to planning. First, the planner's
viewpoint is examined, including his claim to expertise as a justifica-
tion for public intervention into the land market in contravention of
the choices made by private developers. Secondly, the treatment
accorded comprehensive plans by the courts is explored, focusing on
judicial receptivity to the argument that zoning changes should be
consistent with the adopted plan. Thirdly, other uses of plans as a
standard of judicial review are surveyed, with emphasis on the
"activist" approach of intensive review. Lastly, the proper role for
land use plans in judicial reasoning is delineated.
I. THE PLANNER'S VIEWPOINT: ITS DEVELOPMENT
AND CONCEPTUAL UNDERPINNINGS
When a court considers a legislative decision to grant or deny a re-
zoning that is concededly inconsistent with an adopted plan, the court
is in effect reviewing a legislative determination not to follow the plan.
If minimal standards of rationality are met, no unconstitutional taking
will be found. Since a legislative body must be able to exercise its
inherent powers, all zoning is subject to a legislative change of mind.
Constitutional principles, therefore, permit a legislative body to ignore
even existing and adopted plans as only advisory.
In spite of this orthodox analysis, lawyers continue to argue that
a grant or denial of a rezoning allegedly inconsistent with an adopted
plan is invalid. The basis of this argument is the allegation that the
planning choice is rational and departures therefrom should be pre-
sumed arbitrary.' 6
15. Reliance on land use plans will be increased by state legislation that
mandates the preparation of local plans, at the risk of state preemption, and more
importantly establishes procedures to monitor their quality and implementation.
16. The issue raised by this argument is, of course, whether exercise of the
zoning power is an exercise of a legislative function. The same argument would
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Courts are beginning to weigh more carefully the evidence relied
upon by local legislative bodies to support zoning decisions and are
beginning to determine the weight that should be given to planning
choices. Part of this determination is a forced inquiry into planning
assumptions.
A. Planner's Assumptions
Since planning theory is largely divorced from what planners
actually do,17 it is an exercise in futility, in one sense, to determine
the weight courts should give to planning decisions by examining
planning theory. Nevertheless, planning theory remains an important
reference point for two reasons. First, many areas of the country are
trying to make planning theory work and they are, in fact, making
decisions based on traditional assumptions. Secondly, courts need a
general model of planning in order to formulate standards for the
review of planning choices.
The legitimacy of a planning choice rests on the assertion that
collective intervention produces a net gain in society's aggregate wel-
fare.- 8 The planner's claim is that his or her proposal will promote
the most efficient allocation of available resources.' 9 A planning choice
would be readily perceived as legitimate if, by curing market imper-
be made to challenge quasi-judicial action of an administrative agency. Thousands
of judicial decisions state that the drawing of a zoning map and its subsequent
alteration are legislative functions, reviewable only for procedural error or to
determine if constitutional rights have been violated. Despite the view that local
legislative bodies are entitled to the same deference shown state and national
bodies, courts are beginning to seriously question traditional classifications of
zoning functions and the standards of judicial review flowing from these classifica-
tions. For an analysis of the standards courts are developing and rationales for
those standards see Section III of this Article.
17. In practice their contributions to land use allocations are often modest but
very useful civil engineering judgments.
18. See Wheaton & Wheaton, Identifying the Public Interest: Values and Goals,
in URBAN PLANNING IN TRANSITION 152 (E. Erber ed. 1970) [hereinafter cited
as URBAN PLANNING].
19. In recent years it has been argued that equity considerations in planning
should be given a weight equal to that of efficiency. See Dyckman, Social Plan-
ning in the American Democracy, in URBAN PLANNING, supra note 18, at 27.
The use of systematic, expertly-run planning to reduce social inequities has been
justly criticized. For example, Professor Piven has argued, "Systematic Planning,
the use of management expertise, the introduction of service innovations-all of
these developments can be used to reduce the inequities in our society. But they
can also be used to conceal and increase those inequities." Piven, Social Planning
or Politics, in URBAN PLANNING, supra note 18, at 45, 50.
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fections, it achieved an allocation equivalent to that produced by a
perfectly competitive market. Too often, however, the aggregate gains
of a planning choice cannot be demonstrated. The planning choice
is not designed to force internalization of external costs, which are
difficult enough to quantify, but is based upon the assumption that the
planner's re-distributive values are superior to those of the market
and will result in a net gain to the aggregate welfare.20
Planners assert that land use allocation is amenable to rational
evaluation, that collective goals can be evaluated and welded into a
single hierarchy of community objectives, and that planners can
expertly resolve goal conflicts.21 The planner's choices derived from
their overall perspective, however, risk being arbitrary since planners
bear little responsibility for distribution of the costs or benefits of
their activity. Furthermore, the choices are unlikely to rest upon a
widespread consensus that would silence those adversely affected by
short-term losses with the assurance of long-term efficiency gains.22
Thus the choices may be unacceptable to many members of the com-
munity because they appear unfair. The failure to consider the
opportunity costs of the decision will make the planner's efficiency
claims vulnerable to disproof.
B. The Planning Profession's Identity Crisis
The planner's claimed ability to comprehensively analyze a city
and make more accurate land use projections than those of the free
market stems from the reform tradition of planning, which asserted
the superiority of decision-making by neutral experts.
The basic concepts of master planning23 are that a city is a complex,
20. See A. ALTSHULER, THE CITY PLANNING PROCESS 311-12 (1966).
21. Id. at 301-02.
22. See Dunham, Property, City Planning and Liberty, in LAW AND LAND
28-29 (C. Haar ed. 1964).
23. Master planning is a fusion of several important movements. The "city
beautiful" movement was the first planning concept, and it attempted to re-create
the physical grandeur of Europe. Then the ideas of park planners, such as
Fredrick Law Olmstead, began to merge with the urban reform movement,
which viewed planning as a means of population dispersal to relieve inner-city
congestion. With this merger came the dynamic planning theories that replaced
the more static city beautiful idea. The "city functional" movement followed and
initiated the thought of designating areas for particular activities and attempting
to establish satisfactory spatial relationships between them. This movement, in
turn, combined with the German idea of "scientific management," which postu-
lated that planning was a technical process capable of quantifying desired public
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dynamic system and that, if the welfare of all groups is to be advanced,
the city's development must be coordinated in space and over time.2 4
The Standard State Zoning Enabling Act (SZEA) 25 in large measure
adopted the central idea of master planning, but the lawyers who
developed the present structure for land use controls opted for a
narrow theory of market intervention and hence a narrow theory of
planning as well. 26 Unfortunately, little systematic thought had been
given to the relationship between planning and market intervention
at the time land use controls became operational. By and large plan-
ners attempted only to achieve the objectives of free circulation, pro-
outputs. Scientific management also assumed that a single scientific solution
existed for each problem and that those solutions would advance efficiency and
convenience. See M. SCOTT, AMERICAN CITY PLANNING SINCE 1890 123 (1969).
The relationship between planning and the urban reform movements, which at-
tempted to purify the city of politics and run it along business-like lines, has
been traced many times. See, e.g., E. BANFIELD & J. WILSON, CITY POLITICS
138-50, 187-203 (1963). See also Cohen, The Changing Role of the Planner in
the Decision-Making Process, in URBAN PLANNING, supra note 18, at 174, 175-76.
24. It is interesting to note the hypothesis that planning physical space for pre-
determined uses is an undesirable tendency men develop in adolescence to control
unknown threats by eliminating "the possibility for experiencing surprise. By
controlling the frame of what is available for social interaction, the subsequent
path of social action is tamed." R. SENNETT, THE USES OF DISORDER: PER-
SONAL IDENTITY AND CITY LIFE 81-82 (1973).
25. SZEA, supra note 13. For a discussion of the theories of the function of
the general plan and its relationship to zoning that were advanced at the time the
Standard State Zoning Enabling Act was drafted see T. KENT, supra note 13, at
28-38. Kent reports that the drafters generally agreed that the function of the
plan was to guide the future physical development of the community but that they
failed to agree on the relationship between the plan and a zoning ordinance.
Section 6 recommended adoption of a general plan that was defined in four foot-
notes. "In the first footnote the authors state flatly that the zoning plan is to be
included as an integral part of the general plan; and in the second, third and
fourth footnotes, they contradict themselves and state that the general plan must
remain general . . . and that zoning is simply one method of carrying out the
general policies dealing with private property . . . ." Id. at 38. These latter
statements seem to reflect the fear of Bettman (one of the drafters) that the
general plan might be construed as an encumbrance against property, and thus it
should be kept separate from the zoning ordinance. Bettman, City and Regional
Planning Papers, in HARV. CITY PLANNING STUDIES XIII 23-43 (1956). Bassett
subsequently further narrowed the function of the plan, arguing it should be con-
fined to showing existing zoning districts and the future location of streets and
public works. E. BASSETT, THE MASTER PLAN 65-66 (1938).
26. Bassett limited zoning to giving legal sanction to the status quo while pre-
venting only the grossest disorders. His theory of planning logically emphasized
that it was a process of coordinating the location of public works with private
development. E. BASSETT, supra note 25, at 142-43.
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vision of adequate land for uses the community desired to encourage,
and preservation of stable neighborhoods.27
While the idea that planning was more than preservation of the
status quo never truly died, it simply never became operational. Dur-
ing the 1980's, as planners became increasingly alienated from the
market, the static theory of master planning as a fixed-end state
objective was replaced by theories that emphasized planning as a
"continuous process" that would shape and guide the physical growth
and arrangement of towns in harmony with their social and economic
needs.
By the 1950's planners were breaking away from what they con-
sidered the narrow focus on physical development and beginning to
argue that social and economic needs must also be included. Today
the argument for the new comprehensiveness has been resolved at
the theoretical level in favor of including both social and economic
factors.28 As planning's orientation has become more comprehensive,
however, its objectives have become more diffuse, and the planner's
case for the legitimacy of market interference more tenuous.
The identity crisis within the planning profession continued into
the 1960's. Some planners urged that the profession give up its claim
to neutral, technical expertise and adopt the adjudicatory model of
decision-making. Planners were to advocate specific "causes" subject
27. Mocine, Urban Physical Planning and the "New Planning," 32 J. A?, .
INST. PLANNERS 234 (1966), lists the following basic objectives of physical plan-
ning: (1) maximization of economic efficiency by predicting physical facility needs
and coordinating the size and location of such facilities with activity locations;
(2) maximization of desired relationships between land uses; (3) allocation of
scarce land resources to desired activities; and (4) provision of a pleasing general
urban design.
The most influential justification for planning for stable neighborhoods is Perry,
The Neighborhood Unit Formula, in URBAN HousINo 94 (W. Wheaton, G.
Milgram & M. Meyerson eds. 1966). For the debate on this concept see Isaacs,
Attack on the Neighborhood Unit Formula, id. at 109 and Mumford, In Defense
of Neighborhood, id. at 114.
28. See Webber, Comprehensive Planning and Social Responsibility: Towards
an AlP Consensus on the Profession's Roles and Purposes, 29 J. AM. INST. PLAN-
NERS 232 (1963). In the late 1950's and early 1960's sociologists such as Herbert
Gans and urban critics such as Jane Jacobs challenged the planner's assumption
that the physical environment plays a major role in people's lives. Endorsing the
new comprehensiveness, they disagreed "that reshaping this [physical] environ-
ment was the most urgent priority for social action to achieve the good life."
H. GANS, PEOPLE AND PLANS: ESSAYS ON URBAN PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS
1-2 (1968). See also I. JACOBS, DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES
428-48 (1962).
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only to vague professional constraints against the advocacy of specific
solutions." Others have urged planners to become more influential
in day-to-day decision-making by shedding their apolitical role and
participating directly in the policy planning process. Herbert Gans
has called for planners trained in policy formulation:
By planning I mean the method and process of decision-making
which includes the proper formulation of the problems which the
city needs to solve (or of the goals it wishes to achieve); the
determination of the causes of these problems; and the formula-
tion of those policies, action programs, and decisions which will
deal with the causes to solve the problem, and will do so demo-
cratically and without undesirable financial, political, social or
other consequences.
This conception of planning is, of course, totally different from
either traditional comprehensive physical planning or the AlP's
new definition of comprehensive planning.3
Gans's call for a rejection of the old comprehensive planning is a
repudiation of the rational model of planning.3 1 This model, which
exerted the greatest influence on planning theory until recently and
is the model to which courts refer when they call for comprehensive
planning to control exercise of the zoning power,32
sets forth a planning-policy process consisting of five interrelated
steps. These are: (1) identifying and evaluating objectives,
(2) translating objectives into design criteria, (3) utilizing de-
sign criteria to devise plans for the optimal development of speci-
fied systems or achievement of objectives, (4) evaluating the
29. Davidoff, Advocacy and Pluralism in Planning, 31 J. Ar. INST. PLANNERS
331 (1965). This change in focus resulted from the realization that public works
projects, such as those supervised by Robert Moses in New York, often destroyed
stable urban neighborhoods, and that commercial and multi-family developments
were destroying suburban amenities.
30. Gans, The Need for Planners Trained in Policy Formulation, in URBAN
PLANNING, supra note 18, at 239, 240-41. For a criticism of this position see
Rondinelli, Urban Planning as Policy Analysis: Management of Urban Change,
39 J. Am. INsT. PLANNERS 13 (1973).
31. For a more detailed discussion of the failure of the rational model of de-
cision-making to become operational and the consequences of the new political
role of the planner on judicial acceptance of consistency with an adopted plan as
a criterion for judicial review see Section II of this Article infra.
32. See, e.g., Udell v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 235 N.E.2d 897, 288 N.Y.S.2d
888 (1968).
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consequences of alternative planned courses of action, and (5)
implementing the plan through appropriate public policies. 33
The rational model has gradually been abandoned because the
critical assumptions upon which it is based have often proved wrong.
The model assumes a hierarchical planning system in which "a set
of goals and their weights would be prespecified for a consideration
in evaluating alternative land use policies. From the set of goals, a
disaggregated set of social indicators would emerge which provide
signals for actors within the system. The actors in responding to this
set of social indicators would maximize some weighted or unweighted
set of goals."34
While goal formulation through the political process is assumed
as a given, public officials too often refuse to set goals, thereby shifting
the task to planners.35 Planners, as do all reformers, tend to minimize
the importance of conflict, and they assume that consensus is possible
without recognizing the deep value cleavages involved in many land
use conflicts. Their biases, therefore, often lead to the selection of
goals unacceptable to their client groups.36 And in addition to the
problem of goal formulation, the high cost of obtaining information
makes accurate projections either unavailable or available only at
prohibitive cost.
In order to avoid both of these problems, decision theorists, such
as Robert Lindblom, have urged planners to consider incremental,
rather than comprehensive, solutions.37 Lindblom's theory of incre-
mentalism rejects the idea that all change can be controlled, thus
rejecting the central tenets of both the rational model and Gans's
policy planning model. The rational model assumes that norms of
the system are given and that the planner's only task is to translate
those norms into technical decisions. The policy planning model
assumes a group of elite idealists who "conceive of the decision-
making situation as authority to engage in social planning by clar-
33. R. BURBY, PLANNING AND POLITICS: TOWARD A MODEL OF PLANNINO-
RELATED POLICY OUTPUTS IN AMERICAN LOCAL GOVERNMENT 3 (1968).
34. d'Arge, Economic Policies, Environmental Problems and Land Use, in
ENVIRONMENT: A NEW FOCUS FOR LAND-USE PLANNING 157, 164 (D. McAllister
ed. 1974).
35. See A. ALTSHULER, supra note 20, at 306-19.
36. Id. at 84-143.
37. See Lindblom, The Science of "Muddling Through," in A READING IN
PLANNING THEORY 151 (A. Faludi ed. 1973).
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fying a vague criterion."'38 Incrementalism, on the other hand, limits
the planner's role to tinkering with the framework of pluralism., 9
A "due process-equilibrium" model is presumed to be appropriate
for decision-making under incrementalism. Legitimacy is assumed if
a decision attempts to canvass a wide range of information and
opinion, thereby representing various interested groups, and has an
internal logic. In short, the legitimacy of a decision stems from the
process by which it is reached rather than from its substance. "De-
cisions reached as a result of . . . full consideration (of all available
relevant information, including, in appropriate contexts, expert
opinion) are more likely to meet the test of equilibrium theory-
i.e. 'satisfaction,' acceptance, and the like-and do so most of the time."4o
The due process-equilibrium model of planning, rather than dis-
pensing with experts, simply reduces their contribution from a con-
trolling factor to a relevant one, with their accumulated experience
providing some insight into the consequences of alternative land use
patterns. This approach has important consequences, for it shapes
judicial review of land use decisions challenged on the ground of
inconsistency with adopted plans. First, the model does not consider
the plan controlling because planners have not clearly established
their claim to legitimacy. This is because they offer neither a superior
method of allocating land nor a set of values that commands wide
consensus. Secondly, since the planner's conclusions are sometimes
relevant, courts that view the subordination of planning to zoning
law as reducing arbitrary decisions must make the difficult decision as
to when the planner's contribution is relevant, as well as the weight
to which it is entitled. Lastly, the recognition that a planner's con-
tribution is only one component in the legitimization of a planning
decision requires a court to peer behind the plan in order to validate
a decision. The court must decide if the planning process was suffi-
ciently open to command acceptance from those it affects.
38. Schubert, Is There a Public Interest Theory?, in Nosios V 165 (C. Fried-
rich ed. 1962).
39. See Altshuler, Decision-Making and the Trend Toward Pluralistic Planning,
in URBAN PLANNING, supra note 18, at 183, 185.
40. Comment, Public Participation in Federal Administrative Proceedings, 120
U. PA. L. REv. 702, 725 (1972), quoting Schubert, supra note 38, at 170-71.
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II. JUDICIAL TREATMENT OF PLANS
A. Inconsistency with Adopted Plans
Because zoning was originally conceived as a static theory, little
attention was paid to the problem of the processes and standards
under which changes in zoning districts were to occur. Under the
original assumptions of zoning theory, the advance allocation of land
development opportunities among like parcels of land was not thought
to be a difficult problem. Although planners have long maintained
that the purpose of zoning is not only to suppress nuisances but to
promote the general welfare, most courts maintain a more limited
conception of zoning. The basic premise is still that zoning is "more
... an extension of individual property rights than... an instrument
of public policy."4' Zoning is justified as public imposition of a
restrictive covenant scheme upon places where the transaction costs
of private collective organization are too high. This justification for
zoning accords with the classic police power rationale for limiting
the use of property: protection of a common property resource (here,
an area's amenities) to prevent "it from being taken by one of the
common owners without regard to the enjoyment of the others."42
Not surprisingly then, courts have tested the reasonableness of zoning
changes by an equal protection standard that requires consistency
with surrounding uses unless a demonstrable difference exists between
the rezoned tract and the surrounding property.43
The basic reason advanced by courts for not requiring that zoning
be consistent with an adopted plan44 is that the plan has no legal
41. Krasnowiecki, Planned Unit Development: A Challenge to Established
Theory and Practice of Land Use Control, 114 U. PA. L. Rav. 47, 59 (1965).
42. Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190, 210 (1900).
43. See, e.g., Frankel v. City of Atlantic City, 124 N.J. Super. 420, 307 A.2d
615 (App. Div.), rezd on other grounds, 63 N.J. 333, 307 A.2d 562 (1973)
(per curiam). To revivify the development of its once chic ocean front, Atlantic
City liberalized density requirements for ocean front property by establishing a
high-rise apartment zone. The court invalidated the district on the grounds that
all property in like circumstances must be treated alike and that no rational dis-
tinction existed between properties that are or are not appurtenant to the beach.
Id. at 423, 307 A.2d at 616. Although the New Jersey supreme court reversed,
the appellate division opinion is illustrative of the force of equal protection analy-
sis. For an analysis of the equal protection basis of most standards for judicial
review of map amendment decisions see Mandelker, The Role of Law in the
Planning Process, 30 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 26, 33-35 (1965).
44. The conclusion that zoning is not in accordance with a comprehensive plan
is often applied to invalidate a change that is considered "spot zoning." After
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effect and, thus, is advisory at best. States following SZEA have not
required the preparation of a land use plan prior to exercise of the
zoning power. The prevailing reasoning holds,
It is inherent in the recommendatory nature of the comprehensive
planning concept that it neither can nor does have any specific or
litigable impact such as to provide any practical or realistic occa-
sion for judicial intervention. The formulation and adoption of
a comprehensive plan are but intermediate and inconclusive steps
in the planning process, and in themselves are legally ineffective.
No one's rights, pro or con, are affected thereby unless and until
the recommendations thereof be implemented.45
While the advisory nature of an adopted plan logically flows from
the theory of enabling legislation, it does not follow that the passage
of an ordinance in conformity with the plan gives legal effect to the
adopted plan. To hold otherwise would be to assert that the plan is
the organic statute and zoning decisions implementing it are simply
administrative in nature.46 This should not be the basis for requiring
consistency with adopted plans.
Adopted plans should, however, be given some weight in determin-
ing the reasonableness of legislative or administrative decisions. When
the choice is between the proposed and existing uses, it would be
reasonable for a court to presume that a selection made through the
comprehensive planning process surveys a greater range of alternative
determining whether the location and the development plans were consistent with
the community's planning objectives, some courts have invalidated zoning as not
"in accordance with a comprehensive plan" when the governmental unit was
given discretion to locate floating zones on a case-by-case basis. "In other words,
the development itself would become the plan which is manifestly the antithesis
of zoning 'in accordance with a comprehensive plan.'" Eves v. Zoning Bd. of
Adjustment, 401 Pa. 211, 217, 164 A.2d 7, 11 (1960). Eves, however, appears
to have been overruled in Pennsylvania by Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. Appeals,
429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968), and has not been followed in other states.
E.g., Lurie v. Planning & Zoning Comm'n, 160 Conn. 295, 278 A.2d 799 (1971).
45. Penny v. Board of Supervisors, 53 Pa. D. & C. 2d 329, 332 (C.P. Bucks
County 1971); accord, Saenger v. Planning Comm'n, 9 Pa. Commw. 499, 308
A.2d 175 (1973); Morelli v. Borough of St. Marys, 1 Pa. Commw. 612, 275
A.2d 889 (1971). Alabama has adopted a similar analysis. See COME v. Chancy,
289 Ala. 555, 269 So. 2d 88 (1972). Under this analysis, the amendment of the
ordinance is a pro tanto amendment of the plan unless procedures for amending
the plan differ from procedures for amending the ordinance. See Village 2 at
New Hope, Inc. Appeals, 429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968).
46. See Haar, The Master Plan: An Impermanent Constitution, 20 LAw &
CONTEMP. PROB. 353, 355-56 (1955). See also Note, Judicial Review of Land
Bank Dispositions, supra note 12, at 386-94.
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uses for a tract of land than does a choice made through the usual
ad hoc process.47 Thus a party proposing a change that departs from
the plan ought to carry some burden of showing that the planning
choice was unreasonable. The burden, however, should not be so
heavy that it becomes impossible to question the planning choice."
Reasons for denying weight to planning choices lie deeper than
the historic lack of planning and the absence of a statutory require-
ment of consistency with adopted plans. Courts may give some weight
to plans, apart from the zoning ordinance, even without a clear statu-
tory mandate to do so. In a planning decision the real issue is the
legitimacy of value choices made by the governmental unit adopting
the plan.49 If courts subject administrative decisions to review using
a consistency standard, they must question the goals that the plan
seeks to achieve. Yet this judgment has traditionally rested with local
government on the ground that these legislative bodies have been
delegated the authority to make such choices subject only to broad
ultra vires limits.50
47. See Haar, The Master Plan: An Inquiry in Dialogue Form, in LAND-USE
PLANNING 745 (2d ed. C. Haar ed. 1971).
48. A recent Connecticut decision may indicate movement in this direction.
As in many states, Connecticut views the requirement that a zoning change be in
accordance with a comprehensive plan as simply precluding spot zoning. See, e.g.,
Sheridan v. Planning Bd., 159 Conn. 1, 266 A.2d 396 (1969); Luery v. Zoning
Bd., 150 Conn. 136, 187 A.2d 247 (1962). In Lathrop v. Planning & Zoning
Comm'n, 164 Conn. 215, 319 A.2d 376 (1973), a rezoning from residential to
commercial was challenged, in part on the ground that the planning commission's
development plan designated the area as an open-space green belt. Id. at .............
319 A.2d at 381. The court found that the plan itself was inherently contradic-
tory. Id. In addition to providing for green belt areas, the plan posited as one
community objective the broadening of the tax base through controlled business
development in appropriate locations. Id. The plan also seemed to indicate that
commercial zoning on abutting highways would not detract from residential areas
since green belt buffers would also be established. Id. The court concluded, there-
fore, that the "change would permit use of the land for a suitable and appropriate
purpose and that such was in keeping with the orderly development of the com-
prehensive plan for zoning of the entire town." Id. Whether the court is merely
concludingthat the change is reasonable under traditional criteria or holding that
the change is consistent with the adopted plan, the opinion does indicate that some
duty exists to justify departures from the plan on the ground that they advance
another objective of the plan.
49. See D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 58.
50. This is illustrated by Golden v. Planning Bd., 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d
291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1003 (1972), which sustained
"phased growth" zoning. The court held that a city could control the rate and
location of development by a point system matching the rate of new development
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Beyond the reluctance of courts to review underlying value choices
involved in planning, courts have been properly skeptical of consist-
ency with adopted land use plans as a standard of review for other
reasons. The discretion delegated to decision-making units to dis-
criminate among potential uses, which is the essence of planning,
conflicts with the equal protection basis of traditional zoning. Courts
have sanctioned a great deal of discretion on the theory that flexibility
is needed to cope with the dynamics of land development, but, on
the whole, they have retained familiar standards of review based on
equal protection. The primary inquiry remains focused upon the
use's compatibility with surrounding property. This is a comfortable
and manageable standard, enabling courts to fulfill their traditional
function-preventing arbitrary decisions.
The standard of compatibility with surrounding uses, however,
cannot be applied to all cases. For example, when the zoning authority
attempts to reserve land by denying map amendments on the ground
that the plan projects a different use, the problem is the conflicting
efficiency claims of the developer and the community. The question
is not one of preventing the imposition of external costs on third
parties, for in any event such imposition will occur. Yet, the munici-
pality's reservation is bound to strike the court as arbitrary, unless it
can be justified by some general principle, since the recognition of
individual initiative is not viewed as hurting anyone.
Originally planners were interested in deriving specific solutions
from general principles. Despite their repeated assertions that plan-
ning is consistent with traditional notions of individual freedom,
planners failed to appreciate that, in any given case, the resulting
distribution of costs and benefits could be highly arbitrary. In recent
years, however, planners have called for plans that are "legitimate"
in that the distribution of land development opportunities will not
be arbitrary.r'
to the availability of public services. This is a textbook example of rational plan-
ning, with clearly stated goals and regulations subordinated to them.
While Golden does establish that phased growth is permissible under appropriate
enabling authority, the case does not preclude questioning its wisdom. Opposing
such a choice are the substantial potential costs imposed on other areas, especially
if many other communities do likewise.
This argument does not mean to suggest that phased zoning is unconstitutional.
The case for the constitutionality of the Golden ordinance is well made in Note,
Phased Zoning: Regulation of the Tempo and Sequence of Land Development, 26
STAN. L. REV. 585 (1974).
51. See Perin, A Noiseless Seccession from the Comprehensive Plan, 33 J. AM.
INST. PLANNERS 336 (1967).
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B. Attempts to Reconcile Planning with Fairness
The leading attempt to reconcile planning with fairness to those
affected is that of Professor Haar,52 who argues that the difference
between the plan and the zoning map is a matter of ripeness. In
addition, he asserts that the reservation of undeveloped land, until
it can be determined if projected developments do in fact occur, is
fair for two reasons. First, cluttering the tract with interim marginal
improvements might lose more than is gained and risks blighting
surrounding areas.53 Secondly, given the legitimacy of this planning
decision, the planning process is, in the long run, fair to all members
of the community. This is true because the plan, having isolated and
identified the forces shaping the development of the community and
having appraised their impact and probability, is "a conscious master
strategy to optimize the future of the community. It orients public
policy in a predictable way [and] endeavors to liquidate the caprice
of circumstances." 54 All members of the community are provided a
means of rationally pursuing their interests, "protected to some ex-
tent from the attrition of the expected . . .
Professor Haar's argument, however, makes two unwarranted as-
sumptions. First, he assumes that the planning process will generate
consensus over time as people accept the allocation of land develop-
ment opportunities and adjust their behavior accordingly. It is equally
likely that advance assignment will exacerbate, rather than lessen,
tensions. In many cases the plan will merely accelerate the time when
conflicts must be resolved. If, as has been argued, the plan is entitled
to some weight because it creates expectations about what develop-
ment will or will not be allowed, then property owners and lawyers
will perceive planning as a dual-level process of obtaining permission
to develop. If they lose at the first stage (when the plan is considered
and adopted) they may then request a rezoning that, in effect, is an
appeal of the original planning decision. Secondly, Professor Haar
assumes that the plan can embody reasoned choices that command
wide acceptance. Many of the conflicts that the plan seeks to resolve
or minimize are disputes over fundamental values. Procedures that
rest on expertise and attempt to gain acceptance for general principles
52. Haar, supra note 47, at 756.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 753.
55. Id.
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by maximizing citizen input through quasi-adjudicatory hearings will
do little to resolve fundamental value conflicts. 51
Courts are not receptive to Professor Haar's arguments. The leading
case is Biske v. City of Troy"7 in which a "new" and "burgeoning
community" designated the area around a busy intersection for its
future community center. To reserve the land a map amendment for
a service station was denied on the grounds that the change would
be inconsistent with the comprehensive plan. The intermediate ap-
pellate court held that although projections of the master plan were
speculative, they were nonetheless reasonable because a contrary hold-
ing "would have the effect of nullifying all city planning."5 The
Michigan supreme court, however, refused to give the same weight to
the master plan in determining the reasonableness of the rezoning
denial. Stressing that the plan had not been formally adopted, the
court stated that in weighing projections of the city against the
infringement of vested rights, "admirable as the purpose may be
. . . the effect of the 'master plan' is ephemeral and minimal. Over-
riding the ideal are the present, existing circumstances."5 9
56. See Mashaw, The Legal Structure of Frustration: Alternative Strategies
for Public Choice Concerning Federally Aided Highway Construction, 122 U. PA.
L. REv. 1, 66-67 (1973). It is worth observing that perhaps the greatest poten-
tial for effective planning today lies with the Environmental Protection Agency,
which subordinates all conflicts to the statutory goal of maintaining a quality
environment.
57. 381 Mich. 611, 166 N.W.2d 453 (1969).
58. 6 Mich. App. 546, 552, 149 N.W.2d 899, 902 (1967).
59. 381 Mich. at 623, 166 N.W.2d at 460. In criticizing Biske, Professor
Mandelker has made the classic planner's argument-efficiency calculations made
through the planning process are superior to those made through the market.
D. MANDELKER, supra note 1, at 53-54. The fundamental defect in the argument
is that it permits communities to appropriate the benefits of property ownership
(in effect, acquiring an option over the property) without its responsibilities. A
high risk exists that the community's efficiency judgment will be wrong, see
Demsetz, Some Aspects of Property Rights, 9 J. LAw & EcoN. 61 (1966); Tarlock,
Toward a Revised Theory of Zoning, 1972 LAND USE CONTROLS ANN. 141, since
planning projections are made under conditions of uncertainty and rest on a
surprisingly thin information base. This is not to say that Biske is correctly de-
cided, for a court could conclude, by analogy to interim-zoning cases, that reser-
vation of land for a reasonable future period is not an invalid infringement of
property rights. If, however, the plan's claim to reasonableness rests upon Profes-
sor Mandelker's suggested reason, then Biske was correct in refusing to give the
plan evidentiary value.
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III. ACCORDING WEIGHT TO ADOPTED PLANS
An increasing number of cases accord some weight to adopted plans,
which are recognized as separate from the zoning ordinance, in passing
upon the reasonableness of a zoning change or denial. These frag-
mentary cases fall roughly into three categories: the first equates the
absence of a plan with arbitrary action because the stability of prop-
erty values is undermined; the second places some duty on communi-
ties to justify departure from the plan; and the third represents
tentative approaches to the imposition of the rational planning model
on communities.
A. Absence of Plan Equated with Arbitrary Action
The concept of zoning as a stabilizing device explains cases in
which the absence of a comprehensive plan has been equated with
arbitrary action. Raabe v. City of Walker 0 is an excellent example.
An undeveloped area surrounding a stable residential neighborhood
was rezoned to permit heavy industrial development after the chamber
of commerce proposed a plan for an industrial park. The city plan-
ning commission made no recommendation for the site because there
had not been time for a comprehensive study of the entire area and
because petitioners had no specific plan for development. The trial
court ruled that "[t]he regulation must be made in accordance with
a plan. In this case there was no general plan, and the rezoning was
not part of any such general plan."'' In affirming, the Supreme Court
of Michigan found the rezoning inconsistent with the "manifestly
desirable stability of zoning, once it has been ordained and relied
upon for any fair period of repose by home builders and homeowners
as well as those concerned for industrial, commercial, or other reasons
60. 383 Mich. 165, 174 N.W.2d 789 (1970). See also Westwood Forest Estates,
Inc. v. Village of South Nyack, 23 N.Y.2d 424, 244 N.E.2d 700, 297 N.Y.S.2d
129 (1969), which held that denial of an apartment rezoning to prevent pollution
of the Hudson River, because the town's treatment facility could not accommodate
future development, was arbitrary. The court found the rezoning was not in ac-
cordance with a comprehensive plan. Westwood Estates is a classic example of a
decision that is arbitrary because the cost imposed on the landowner was unre-
lated to any benefits to society, since there was no showing that pollution of the
Hudson River would be ameliorated. A similar approach was taken in Petlin
Associates, Inc. v. Township of Dover, 64 N.J. 327, 316 A.2d 1 (1974), which
invalidated a rezoning for a hospital-medical zone because no real consideration
had been given to how the property would fit into an integrated and compre-
hensive plan.
61. 383 Mich. at 170, 174 N.W.2d at 792.
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. . ."6 The court stated that the absence of a community land use
plan, or at least a recent area study, weakened the presumption of
validity attending any "regular-on-its-face municipal zoning ordinance
or amendment thereof."6 3
B. Duty to Justify Departure from the Plan
Kentucky is the jurisdiction most explicitly imposing some burden
on the community to justify a rezoning that departs from the plan. 64
The state has unique enabling legislation requiring not only the
preparation of a land use plan but also a planning commission or
local legislative finding that rezoning is consistent with the plan.6 5
62. Id. at 177, 174 N.W.2d at 795. Protection of surrounding landowners
conflicts with the classic zoning theory that the classification should reflect the
highest and best use of the property. Increasingly the conflict is resolved in favor
of surrounding owners. See, e.g., Hukle v. Kansas City, 212 Kan. 627, 512 P.2d
457 (1973). In holding that the city need not rezone an area for apartment
uses because of street and sewer problems the court noted "[t]he most appropriate
use of land throughout an entire city is not to be discouraged; however, the
highest and best use of a particular tract is not necessarily a controlling factor."
Id. at ................ 512 P.2d at 465.
63. 383 Mich. at 178, 174 N.W.2d at 796. Accord, Forestview Homeowners
Ass'n Inc. v. County of Cook, 18 Ill. App. 3d 230, 309 N.E.2d 763 (1974),
holding that "the failure . . . to plan comprehensively for the use and develop-
ment of land . ..and [the] failure to relate . .. rezoning decisions to data files
and plans of other ... county agencies" weakened the presumption of validity
that would otherwise attach. Id. at 243, 309 N.E.2d at 773.
64. Connecticut cases adopting this approach have already been discussed.
See note 48 supra.
65. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 100.213 (Baldwin 1969).
CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 65860(a)-(b) (West Supp. 1974) require that various
land uses authorized in the ordinance be "compatible with the objectives, policies,
general land uses and programs specified in the [comprehensive] plan." The im-
pact of this requirement on judicial review is not clear; the statute seems to con-
template that inconsistencies will be removed by amending the plan. Id. §
65860(c).
The prior California legislation was construed in Selby Realty Co. v. City of
San Buenaventura, 10 Cal. 3d 110, 514 P.2d 111, 109 Cal. Rptr. 799 (1973).
Plaintiff owned land located in both the city of San Buenaventura and Ventura
County. It submitted proposals for an apartment complex to be located on prop-
erty designated by the circulation element of the city-county land use plan for a
street extension. Plaintiff brought an action for declaratory relief against both the
city and the county alleging that the plan constituted a taking. The court first
held the action against the county premature because neither the city nor county
had attempted to implement the plan. It described the plan in the following
terms: "The plan is by its very nature merely tentative and subject to change
.I... The adoption of a general plan is a legislative act. Since the wisdom of
the plan is within the legislative and not the judicial sphere, a landowner may
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This provides a statutory basis for finding that rezonings departing
from the plan without justification are arbitrary, regardless of how
the case would be decided under traditional reasonableness standards.
The impact of the Kentucky legislation is illustrated by City of
Louisville v. Kavanaugh.3 The City's comprehensive plan designated
a tract (which was zoned single-family) for multi-family development.
The City denied petitioner's application for a rezoning to construct
multi-family housing, thereby refusing to conform zoning to the plan.
The Kentucky court of appeals noted that "a comprehensive land
use plan is a guide rather than a strait jacket,"67 but reasoned, "Never-
theless, such a plan, if it has any reason for existence, must be re-
garded as a basic scheme generally outlining planning and zoning
objectives in an extensive area."68 The court went on to hold that
the record made before the planning commission and the legislative
not maintain an action to probe the merits of the plan absent allegation of a de-
fect in the proceedings leading to its enactment." Id. at ................, 514 P.2d at
115-16, 109 Cal. Rptr. at ................. Plaintiff had a stronger case against the
city because its denial of a building permit could be characterized as an improper
implementation of the general plan. The court held that an action for declaratory
relief was an inappropriate method for judicial review of administrative decisions
and that the adoption of a general plan did not constitute a taking. The court's
characterization of the plan as non-binding will surely have to be reevaluated in
light of CAL. GOV'T CODE § 65860(a) (West Supp. 1974). The opinion is critically
analyzed in The Supreme Court of California 1972-1973, Property, 62 CALIF. L.
REv. 408, 624-38 (1974).
Other enabling legislation requires preparation of a plan and specifies that it
shall be implemented by a zoning ordinance "for the purpose of carrying out the
policies and goals of the land use plan" but does not expressly require that sub-
sequent amendments be consistent with that plan. See, e.g., ME. REv. STAT. ANN.
tit. 30, § 4961-2 (1973); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 462.357 (1974).
66. 495 S.W.2d 502 (Ky. 1973). Surprisingly the court made no mention of the
enabling legislation although it cited cases construing the statute. See, e.g., Fal-
Ion v. Baker, 455 S.W.2d 572 (Ky. 1970) (rezoning of site for regional shopping
center not in conformity with land use plan held arbitrary). The controversy is
discussed in Tarlock, Not in Accordance with a Comprehensive Plan: A Case
Study of Regional Shopping Center Location Conflicts in Lexington, Kentucky,
1970 URBAN L. ANN. 133. See also Wells v. Fiscal Court, 457 S.W.2d 498 (Ky.
1970).
67. 495 S.W.2d at 505, citing Ward v. Knippenberg, 416 S.W.2d 746, 748
(Ky. 1967). Ward was decided prior to the effective date of Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 100.213 (Baldwin 1969).
68. 495 S.W.2d at 505; cf. Sonneland v. City of Spokane, 4 Wash. App. 865,
484 P.2d 421 (1971). In upholding the reasonableness of a rezoning, the Sonne-
land court stressed that the planning commission had not disregarded the plan
and that the commission "gave it serious consideration during its deliberations
upon the proposed change." Id. at 870, 484 P.2d at 424.
[Vol. 9:69
LAND USE PLANS AS A STANDARD OF REVIEW
body clearly established that the present single-family zoning was
"no longer appropriate."69 The trial court's assignment of a multi-
family classification to the property was upheld upon the ground that
such a designation conformed to both the planning commission's
recommendation and the comprehensive land use plan's classification
of the area.70 In the absence of evidence that some other category
of use might be more appropriate and that the plan should be
amended, the plan must be followed to avoid a finding of arbitrary
action by the local legislative body.71
C. Imposition of a Planning Process Rather Than
Comprehensive Planning
As long as map amendment decisions are considered legislative and
minimal standards of rationality are met, municipalities have the
discretion to make classification decisions in undeveloped or developing
areas on whatever grounds they choose. In recent years, however, the
classification of map amendment decisions as a legislative function
has come under attack; the argument is being made that such de-
cisions are, in reality, administrative and that the municipality must
bear a higher burden of justification. This is one means by which
courts have attempted to impose rational planning on communities
by exercising greater control over the decision-making process at the
time of a zoning change.
The basis for the argument that the municipality must justify its
decision as being consistent with a comprehensive plan, or that the
decision-making process must be rational, can be found in federal
and state cases interpreting the National Environmental Policy Act
of 19692 and its state progeny73 to require that actions with a signi-
ficant environmental impact be justified by the agency undertaking
the action. "Rational," as interpreted by these courts, requires that
the decision-maker (1) display the costs of an action, unless that
information is not available at reasonable cost; (2) study a reasonable
range of alternatives that might minimize costs; and (3) come to a
69. 495 S.W.2d at 505.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-47 (1970).
73. For a discussion of state legislation modeled after NEPA see Hagman,
NEPA's Progeny Inhabit the States-Were the Genes Defective?, 7 URBAN L.
ANN. 3 (1974).
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well-considered decision that balances the costs and benefits of the
action.74
Courts applying the developing law of impact analysis seem
to equate a decision-making process satisfying this model with one
that promotes advance planning, or that is at least an adequate
substitute for the advance allocation of land development opportuni-
ties. The theory justifying this approach to promote planning is that
a decision cannot be justified as rational unless it was made pursuant
to a plan, since the judicially required process is the classic rational
model. The zoning authority must either demonstrate consistency
with a plan or be prepared to do considerable planning in the course
of passing on a specific zoning change request.
1. Rationale for More Intensive Review
Justice Levin of the Michigan supreme court has articulated the
rationale for a more intensive review of the zoning change process.
Concurring in Kropf v. City of Sterling Heights,5 which refused to
accept the preferred use doctrine developed by intermediate appellate
courts70 and reaffirmed the normal presumption of validity, he argued
that zoning changes are adjudicatory rather than legislative acts:
"Nothing is more specific, less general, than the zoning ordinance of
most developed communities. While passed in the form of a law,
the typical zoning ordinance represents particularized applications of
administrative power, reflecting choices made over an extended period
of time between particular properties and proposed developments
ad hoc, ad hominem."7 7
74. The leading case is Calvert Cliff's Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. ABC, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). A leading judicial activist has described the en-
vironmental impact review cases as requiring that an "official or agency take a
'hard look' at all relevant factors. And when the matter is not brought to court
on a direct review procedure, as to a court of appeals after some kind of inquiry
on a more or less formal record, the court, in this case the district court, is en-
titled to probe the matter." Leventhal, Environmental Decisionmaking and the
Role of the Courts, 122 U. PA. L. Rav. 509, 514 (1974). Reliance on impact
analysis, coupled with some planning, is strongly endorsed in TASK FORCF ON
LAND USB & URBAN GROWTH, supra note 9, at 195-208.
75. 391 Mich. 139, 215 N.W.2d 179 (1974).
76. For a discussion of the preferred use doctrine and how Kropf fits into the
case development see 8 URBAN L. ANN. 207 (1974).
77. 391 Mich. at 167, 215 N.W.2d at 191. Justice Levin cited recent cases in
Oregon and Washington, e.g., Fasano v. Board of County Comm'rs, 264 Ore.
574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973), and Durocher v. King County, 80 Wash. 2d 139, 492
P.2d 547 (1972), that have classified map amendments as adjudicatory because
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Proceedings based on individual grounds are quasi-judicial.78 The
standard of review, therefore, becomes substantial evidence on the
whole record.
The relationship between adjudicatory classification of zoning
amendment decisions and planning is not obvious. Rather than clari-
fying this point, Justice Levin's approach is more concerned with
stripping away the presumption of validity in order to focus on the
policy objectives of zoning-perhaps with a view toward confining
zoning to more specified objectives. The potential link, however, is
suggested by Citizens Association of Georgetown, Inc. v. Zoning Com-
mission.79 Plaintiffs challenged the refusal of the District of Columbia
to enact an interim ordinance preventing the establishment of a
high-rise commercial center in an area recommended for low-density
residential and parkland by the National Capital Planning Com-
mission. The argument that departures from a planning recom-
mendation had to be justified by a "compelling public interest" was
rejected on traditional grounds. The court held, however, that the
refusal to enact the interim ordinance was invalid for failing to state
reasons and remanded for such a statement. Following recent District
of Columbia circuit decisions, the court closely supervised the agency
action and expressed hope that "the articulation of reasons by an
agency-for itself and for the public-does afford a safeguard against
arbitrary and careless action and is apt to result in greater consistency
in an agency's decision-making." 80
In justifying a statement of reasons for what has traditionally been
classified as a legislative act, the court tried to steer a middle course
between reclassification of the decision as adjudicative on the one
hand, and a standard of review more intense than mere rationality
but less strict than substantial evidence on the whole record on the
other:
the costs and benefits of the decision are often focused on a limited class of
residents rather than on the public generally. For an insightful analysis of the
ambiguity between the legislative and administrative nature of map amendments
see Krasnowiecki, The Basic System of Land Use Control: Legislative Pre-Regu-
lation v. Administrative Discretion, in THE NEw ZONING: LEGAL, ADMINISTRA-
TIVE AND ECONOImc CONCEPTS AND TECHNIQUES 3, 6-10 (N. Marcus & M.
Grove eds. 1970).
78. 391 Mich. at 169-70, 215 N.W.2d at 193-94.
79. 477 F.2d 402 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
80. Id. at 408.
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It is true that the Zoning Commission is a quasi-legislative
body and is not required to support its legislative-type judgments
with findings of fact. But, as the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals has noted, there are important elements of a non-legisla-
tive nature to the Commission's decisions. And there are important
distinctions between our review of the Zoning Commission and
our review of the acts of a legislature. Thus, while the legislative
character of the Commission's decision may take it outside the
strict application of Chenery, the Commission may still be required
to state reasons for its decisions. Reasons differ from findings in
that reasons relate to law, policy, and discretion rather than to
facts and even where findings are not required, a disclosure of
an agency's reasons is often desirable.-'
The impact of Citizens Association and Justice Levin's concurring
opinion in Kropf cannot be appraised without examining the tension
underlying the current "activist" approach to judicial review of
zoning changes.
2. Tension in More Intensive Review
Courts attempting to take an active role in reviewing zoning
changes are starting from two inconsistent premises and attempting
to achieve two potentially different objectives. First, having been
told by planners that cities should map out the location of urban
growth before it occurs, the courts are trying to impose a process
that will force communities to undertake the comprehensive advance
allocation of land development opportunities. Yet while the courts
are trying to achieve this idealistic vision of planning, they know
that the zoning process is a shambles. Changes often result from
bribes, or more benignly, from the naive belief that all development
is progress, rather than from a conscious attempt to examine critically
and anticipate the impact of change on the immediate area, let alone
the community in general. Secondly, to protect applicants and in-
terested third parties from this increasingly arbitrary process, courts
seek to impose an adjudicatory model on zoning changes and to
narrow the limits of local discretion. The apparent rationale is that
if local legislative bodies are forced to articulate reasons, consistent
81. Id. at 408-09 (footnotes omitted). SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80
(1943) invalidated an SEC order on the ground that the Commission, if acting
in a judicial capacity, had to demonstrate that the transactions it sought to pro-
hibit would be harmful. The Court suggested that harm could be presumed if
the Commission was acting under its delegated rule-making powers.
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patterns of decisions will emerge, factors will ripen into standards,
and the risk of arbitrariness will be reduced. 82
This tension is nowhere better illustrated than in Fasano v. Board
of County Commissioners,8 3 which began by seeking to coordinate
master planning and zoning but ended by giving priority to reform
of the zoning process. The county commissioners granted a zoning
change for a planned-unit trailer park, following the favorable recom-
mendation of the county planning commission. The supreme court
reversed, holding that a zoning change must be proved consistent with
a comprehensive plan:
Although we are aware of the analytical distinction between zon-
ing and planning, it is clear that under our statutes the plan
adopted by the planning commission and the zoning ordinances
enacted by the county governing body are closely related; both
are intended to be parts of a single integrated procedure for land
use control. The plan embodies policy determinations and guiding
principles; the zoning ordinances provide the detailed means of
giving effect to those principles."
After apparently adopting the Haar theory that zoning should be
subordinate to planning,5 however, the court quickly abandoned it
82. Imposition of an adjudicatory model on these bodies may promote planning
as a secondary by-product of the reform of the zoning process, but it will not be the
comprehensive advance allocation of land development opportunities envisioned in
master plans. Instead, decision-makers and planners will be forced to take a
limited look into the future, since, before current proposals can be properly
evaluated, changes in adopting land use patterns and other foreseeable impacts
must be surveyed and accounted for in the decision.
83. 264 Ore. 574, 507 P.2d 23 (1973).
84. Id. at 582, 507 P.2d at 27; see ORE. REv. STAT. §§ 215.050, 215.110(1)(1972). Evolution of the Oregon supreme court's standards of judicial review of
zoning decisions is traced in Sullivan, From Kroner to Fasano: An Analysis of
Judicial Review of Land Use Regulation in Oregon, 10 NVILLAMIETTE L.J. 358
(1974).
85. The Hawaiian supreme court has accepted the argument that zoning should
be subordinated to planning in two important cases construing procedures set out
in the Honolulu city-county Charter for amending the general land use plan. The
Charter provides that "[nlo . .. zoning ordinance shall be initiated or adopted
unless it conforms to and implements the general plan. .-. ." Dalton v. City &
County of Honolulu, 51 Hawaii 400, 413, 462 P.2d 199, 207 (1969). Dalton
invalidated a three-step procedure to increase the residential densities on a 47-acre
tract. The city and county first used the general procedure for amending an ordi-
nance to amend the general plan, then to make the same change on the general
plan's detailed land use map and finally to change the zoning classification from
Rural Protective to Apartment District. The court held that the purpose of the
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by stripping away the presumption of validity for local legislative
actions. By holding map amendments to be quasi-judicial acts, the
court rejected the arbitrary and capricious standard applicable to
review of legislative acts. The basis of the court's reasoning was the
assertion, grounded in experience but flatly at variance with genera-
tions of constitutional commentary, that "[local and small decision
groups are simply not the equivalent in all respects of state and
national legislatures."8s
After adopting a procedure for future applicants,s7 the court found
the staff report supporting the proposed change insufficient to meet
Charter was to put "teeth into the requirement that the general plan be 'long-range'
by providing a test for courts to use in reviewing zoning ordinances, i.e., if a
zoning ordinance does not 'conform to and implement' the general plan, then the
city did not have the power to adopt it." Id. at 413, 462 P.2d at 207. Specif-
ically the court suggested that the city had to present studies showing that the
original assumptions of the plan had been re-evaluated and that the new studies
were comprehensive. Thus the same procedures characterized as "safeguards '
applicable to adoption of the general plan have to be followed in amending the
plan. Id. at 416, 462 P.2d at 209.
Hall v. City & County of Honolulu ................ Hawaii ..............., 530 P.2d 737
(1975), applied Dalton to invalidate a procedure used to shrink densities in the
Waikiki-Diamond Head area of Honolulu. In 1964 the general plan designated
the area primarily residential with a small portion devoted to apartment use. In
1967 the city and county plan commission began hearings on the detailed land
use map and development plan for the area. Two years later the Mayor's Ad-
visory Committee on Diamond Head recommended that 29.29 acres be acquired
as a park to block a condominium. The Planning Director ultimately recom-
mended that the general plan for the area be changed to parks and recreation,
and the City Planning Commission and the City Council passed the necessary
amendments. The Planning Commission approved the recommendation without
a public hearing. The court held that the plan was amended in violation of the
Charter provisions construed in Dalton. The only public hearings dealt with the
detailed land use map; the court held that the map is different from the general
plan because the former "merely provides in more detail the specific boundaries
of the various land use activities shown on the General Plan." Id. at ................ ,
530 P.2d at 741. The Commission must therefore hold a hearing specifically to
amend the general plan and must demonstrate that the amendments are based on
"[a]n updated comprehensive and long-range study of the General Plan and of
any amendments thereto; . . ." Id.
86. 264 Ore. at 580, 507 P.2d at 26.
87. With future cases in mind, it is appropriate to add some brief remarks
on questions of procedure. Parties at the hearing before the county govern-
Ing body are entitled to an opportunity to be heard, to an opportunity to
present and rebut evidence, to a tribunal which is impartial in the matter-
i.e., having had no pre-hearing or ex parte contacts concerning the question
at issue-and to a record made and adequate findings executed.
Id. at 588, 507 P.2d at 30; see Comment, Zoning Amendments-The Product of
Judicial or Quasi-judicial Action, 33 OHIo ST. L.J. 130-43 (1972).
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the required burden of proof.ss The court refused to accept what it
considered a generalized and conclusory argument-that the proposed
use conformed to the plan-partly because the county's comprehensive
plan was not in the record, thereby prohibiting adequate judicial
determination of the issues."
The most questionable aspect of Fasano is its shift of the burden
of proof to the applicant seeking a change in the status quo:
The more drastic the change, the greater will be the burden of
showing that it is in conformance with the comprehensive plan
as implemented by the ordinance, that there is a public need for
the kind of change in question, and that the need is best met by
the proposal under consideration. As the degree of change in-
creases, the burden of showing that the potential impact upon the
area in question was carefully considered and weighed will also
increase. If other areas have previously been designated for the
particular type of development, it must be shown why it is neces-
sary to introduce it into an area not previously contemplated and
why the property owners there should bear the burden of the
departure.9 0
88. When we apply the standards we have adopted to the present case, we
find that the burden was not sustained before the commission. The record
now before us is insufficient to ascertain whether there was a. justifiable basis
for the decision. The only evidence in the record, that of the staff report of
the Washington County Planning Department, is too conclusory and super-
ficial to support the zoning change. It merely states:
The staff finds that the requested use does conform to the residential
designation of the Plan of Development. It further finds that the pro-
posed use reflects the urbanization of the County and the necessity to
provide increased densities and different types of housing to meet the
needs of urbanization over that allowed by the existing zoning ...
264 Ore. at 588-89, 507 P.2d at 30.
89. Such generalizations and conclusions, without any statement of the facts
on which they are based, are insufficient to justify a change of use. More-
over, no portions of the comprehensive plan of Washington County are be-
fore us, and we feel it would be improper for us to take judicial notice of
the plan without at least some reference to its specifics by counsel.
As there has not been an adequate showing that the change was in ac-
cord with the plan, or that the factors listed in ORS 215.055 were given
proper consideration, the judgment is affirmed.
Id. at 589, 507 P.2d at 30; see ORE. REv. STAT. § 215.055 (1972).
90. 264 Ore. at 586, 507 P.2d at 29. The court acknowledged inevitable
criticism from scholars who advocate flexibility and discretion for planning au-
thorities, but in weighing the effect of making change more burdensome against
the danger that zoning changes would result from private economic pressures on
local governments, the court chose to protect the planning system from the latter
evil:
By treating the exercise of authority by the commission in this case as the
exercise of judicial rather than of legislative authority and thus enlarging the
scope of review on appeal, and by placing the burden .. . of proof upon the
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This was done because the court had previously adopted the Maryland
change or mistake rule.91 Fasano formally abandoned the rule in
favor of a standard requiring consistency with the comprehensive
plan. The shift of the burden of proof, however, robs the compre-
hensive plan of its intended impact-shaping the community's future.
An applicant for a change that conforms with the plan cannot now
be assured that the change will be valid as long as the reasonableness
of the plan can be defended. The applicant must, it appears, also
show that the newly authorized use can only be located where the
legislative body has designated in the rezoning, because no other
feasible alternative site exists in the community for such a use. 2 This
is the logical consequence of eliminating the presumption of validity
in favor of theories demanding more intense judicial review of legisla-
tive actions. The latter are based on the constitutional theory that
actions interfering with constitutional rights (here, apparently, ex-
pectations of stability) are justifiable only on the grounds that they
represent the least restrictive alternative. 93
On the other hand, under the Haar theory (that zoning should
be subordinate to planning) the burden of proof logically would be
on the party, whether municipality or landowner, urging a result
that is at variance with the plan. Fasano, however, wisely rejects the
Haar thesis in favor of "judicialized" proceedings that require the
decision-maker to justify his decision by showing that all relevant
one seeking change, we may lay the court open to criticism by legal scholars
who think it desirable that planning authorities be vested with the ability to
adjust more freely to changed conditions. However, having weighed the
dangers of making desirable change more difficult against the danqers of the
almost irresistible pressures that can be asserted by private economic interests
on local government, we believe that the latter dangers are more to be feared.
Id. at 587-88, 507 P.2d at 29-30.
91. Under the change or mistake rule, amendments to the existing zoning may
be granted only when the applicant produces evidence of "substantial change in
the character of the neighborhood where the property is located or . . . a mistake
in the existing zoning classification." MD. ANN. CODE art. 66b, § 4.05(a) (1970).
See generally 1 R. ANDERSON, THE AMERICAN LAw oF ZONING § 4.29 (1968); 1
A. & C. R.ATHKopF, THE LAW OF ZONING AND PLANNING 27-13 to -23 (3d ed. 1974).
Regarding Oregon's adoption of the rule see Cunningham v. City of Brookings,
11 Ore. App. 579, 504 P.2d 760 (1972); Smith v. County of Washington, 241
Ore. 380, 406 P.2d 545 (1965); Page v. City of Portland, 178 Ore. 632, 165
P.2d 280 (1946).
92. This standard, as applied in Fasano, will make it unnecessarily difficult to
locate planned unit development districts.
93. See Comment, The Limits of Permissible Exclusion in Fiscal Zoning, 53
B.U.L. REv. 453, 475-79 (1973).
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interests have been considered and by explicitly discussing the trade-
offs involved in the decision.9  Technically, the burden of producing
such a record is on the applicant. To support a favorable decision,
however, he or she must demonstrate that this process has occurred.
This process is likely to be fairer to all relevant interests, while
simultaneously inducing modest but needed improvements in the
management of change through planning.
An important question left unanswered by Kropf, Citizens Associa-
tion and Fasano is whether this increased judicial scrutiny will apply
to review of land use plans. 95 These cases assume that piecemeal
94. Professor Krasnowiecki has advanced a similar proposal for Maryland. He
correctly argues that the "emphasis on the adoption of the plan" tends to limit
the experience gained by the community in its preparation "to a particular period
in the community's history and . . .tends to overemphasize the value of long range
commitment to the exclusion of repeated stocktaking and reevaluation in light of
changing circumstances." Krasnowiecki, Model Land Use Development Code, in
Maryland Planning and Zoning Law Study Comm'n: Final Report 53, 109(1969). He recommends that all regulatory actions be submitted to the planning
staff for comment and recommendations, that plans be annually reviewed, and that
"amendments which are inconsistent with the ongoing plan cannot be validly
adopted until the plan is modified at its next annual review." Id. at 110. This
limits planning to the functions of information assembly and display, pulse-taking,
and feedback review, leaving policy formulation to the local legislative body or
unit to whom the power has been delegated. See Meyerson, Building the Middle-
Range Planning Bridge for Comprehensive Planning, 33 J. Amr. INST. PLANNERS
58 (1956). See also Robinson, Beyond the Middle-Range Planning Bridge, in A
READER IN PLANNINo THEORY 171 (A. Faludi ed. 1973).
95. A further question, left open by Fasano, is whether a developer can first
amend the comprehensive plan and then seek a map amendment for a use that is
now consistent with the plan. A recent Oregon circuit court decision held Fasano
equally applicable to piecemeal amendments of the comprehensive plan. Tierney
v. Duris, No. 33-384, 33-943, (Wash. City Cir. Ct., March 19, 1974), reprinted
in ALI-ABA, LAND USE LITIGATION: CRITICAL ISSUES FOR ATTORNEYS, DE-
VELOPERS, AND PUBLIC OFFICIALS 57 (1974). The developer of a small shopping
center in the middle of the city's arterial highway "strip" secured an amendment
to the city's comprehenisve plan in order to pave the way for a subsequent map
amendment. The trial judge held that an amendment to a plan must (1) conform
to the basic purpose and spirit of the plan, (2) contribute to the general welfare,
and (3) be based on adequate study of the full implications of the change. He
found that the change was inconsistent with ORE. REV. STAT. § 227.240 (1973),
which requires that zoning regulations be "in accord with a well considered plan"
and that Fasano requires greater justification for an amendment to the plan than
the city had provided. Specifically, the trial judge held that the decision was
deficient because no findings of fact had been made to support the change and,
more interestingly, that the change did not conform to the basic purpose and
spirit of the plan because the entire plan had been adopted only fifteen months
prior to the change.
In a case decided after Tierney an intermediate appellate court held that ORE.
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zoning changes are in fact adjudicatory actions and reviewable as
such. By implication these courts assume that there is a distinction
between such changes and a comprehensive zoning ordinance or land
use plan, and that comprehensive zoning ordinances and land use
plans would still be entitled to the presumption of validity on the
grounds that they remain "true" legislative processes. The courts
assume that a piecemeal change involves the particularized application
of a standard, and hence is adjudicatory, but that a comprehensive
ordinance or plan involves the formulation of general standards and
thus is entitled to the presumption of validity. This does not follow,
however, because the methodological differences between a piecemeal
change and a comprehensive ordinance and plan are often insignificant.
Additionally, a land use plan specific enough to guide future develop-
ment by constraining the range of choices open to the implementing
body is invariably the sum of numerous small-scale adjudications.
The difference between planning and the map amendment process
is that in the former adjudication is made unilaterally by planners
with sporadic public input (although sophisticated landowners are
now paying much more attention to plans); in the latter affected
parties are given notice of the proposed action, even if the proceed-
ings are not cast in an adjudicatory mold, and can contest it before
some formally constituted body. Review of decisions taken in a
comprehensive plan may present timing problems. Principles de-
Rxv. STAT. § 227.240 (1973) was sufficiently different from Fasano so that the
requirements were not applicable to cities. Baker v. City of Milwaukee, 17
Ore. App. 389, 520 P.2d 479 (1974). Fasano may rest on due process
rather than statutory grounds, however, and thus be applicable to all units of
government and to all piecemeal zoning adjustments. See West v. City of Astoria,
.......-........ Ore. App -................. , 524 P.2d 1216, 1223 (1974) (Schwab, C.J., con-
curring specially).
The Kentucky court of appeals has held that "if the legislative body makes
a zoning change despite the planning commission's recommendation against
it, the legislative body must make a finding of adjudicative facts from the record
of a trial-type hearing held either by the planning commission or by the legislative
body." Hays v. City of Winchester, 495 S.W.2d 768, 769 (Ky. 1973). See also
City of Louisville v. McDonald, 470 S.W.2d 173 (Ky. 1971).
The response adopted by the Pennsylvania court to the problem of change
versus stability seems more satisfactory. Village 2 at New Hope, Inc. Appeals,
429 Pa. 626, 241 A.2d 81 (1968), rejected an argument that a community could
not adopt a planned unit development ordinance for a tract designated low-density
residential in the plan, holding that "plans may be changed by the passage of new
zoning ordinances, provided the local legislature passes the new ordinance with
some demonstration of sensitivity to the community as a whole, and the impact
that the new ordinance will have on this community." Id. at 632, 241 A.2d at 84.
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veloped in the previously discussed cases apply equally to review of
planning choices contained in a comprehensive land use plan as well
as to piecemeal zoning or planning choices.
IV. PROPER JUDICIAL REGARD FOR LAND USE PLANS
No persuasive reason exists to require that zoning changes be
consistent with adopted comprehensive plans. First, the legitimacy
of planning choices has not been established. Secondly, the lack of
a consistent rationale for advance allocation of land development
opportunities creates a substantial risk that these allocations will be
both arbitrary and inefficient. The courts have, therefore, correctly
viewed map amendments as pro tanto amendments to the land use
plan. Courts also have properly reviewed zoning changes on reason-
ableness grounds, focusing primarily upon the foreseeable community
benefits flowing from the legislative decision and on the friction be-
tween the proposed use and surrounding tracts. Further, cases such
as Fasano, which have undertaken a reform of the zoning process,
properly concentrate on confining the discretion of local legislative
bodies. This is accomplished by requiring greater justification for
grants or denials of rezoning rather than by broadening the discretion
to plan and to impose planning choices through zoning.
I do not, however, mean to argue that planning has no utility or
even that a plan's existence has no bearing on the reasonableness of
a legislative choice. Obviously, planning is one useful method for
identifying community objectives and adapting to future develop-
ments.9 6 When planning is undertaken through an acceptable process,
courts should in some instances validate choices based upon such
planning. Traditional comprehensive planning, however, will play
a decreasing role in the adjustment of land use conflicts; it has little
to contribute to the solution of the major land use conflicts of the
foreseeable future and, consequently, should not be enshrined in
either enabling acts or judicial decisions. Furthermore, planning
undertaken in the future will be more focused than that done in the
past. Relevant criteria will be increasingly spelled out in state enabling
legislation, federal land use planning assistance legislation, and local
ordinances. As a result "[e]ffective plans and policies will need to
96. See Black, The Comprehensive Plan, in PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF
URBAN PLANNING 358 (4th ed. W. Goodman & F. Freund eds. 1968).
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deal less often with the results of development and far more often
with the objective and constraints that shape it."91 Planning remains
relevant to two of the basic land use problems now confronting the
United States-recognition of land development's environmental im-
pact and rationalization of a free-wheeling, ad hoc, and often corrupt,
decision-making process.9 8
The solution to environmental problems requires a combination
of impact analysis and the withdrawal of land from development. 0
Difficult political choices must ultimately be made about how much
land is to be withdrawn to enhance environmental quality. Planners
have undertaken impact analysis for years but have been unsuccessful
in withdrawing land from development, partly because of restrictions
on use of the police power to preserve open space and partly because
plans have more often projected where development should go rather
than where it should not.
The thrust of recent innovations in state land use controls has been
to establish and implement land withdrawal plans analogous to those
97. TAsKc FORCE ON LAND USE & UR3AN GROWTH, supra note 9, at 211.
98. Two other current land use problems exist: the appropriate balance be-
tween providing adequate housing opportunities coupled with maintenance of
high-amenity communities and urban neighborhoods, and the balance between
growth and fiscal base. Planning is irrelevant to solving these problems because
conflicts between communities claiming a right of self-determination and those
claiming a right of access are fundamental value conflicts. Such clashes will have
to be resolved by political decisions addressed to the questions whether decision-
making power should be reallocated to new and higher units of government or
whether communities can set their own quotas, and whether more precise legisla-
tive definitions of the limitations on using the police power to maintain fiscal sta-
bility are needed. See generally R. BABCocK, THE ZomNIo GA3 E (1966). Only
after these decisions have been made does planning become meaningful.
99. Impact analysis is not inconsistent with a comprehensive planning process
since, in theory, environmental impacts would be considered in the process
of preparing a plan, and the final plan would strike the necessary balance between
environmental and other relevant considerations. Existence of a plan would limit
impact analysis review to consideration of local effects that are not contained in
the plan. Cf. Maryland-Nat'l Capital Park & Planning Comm'n v. United States
Postal Service, 487 F.2d 1029 (D.C. Cir. 1973). For a perceptive discussion of the
relationship between environmental impact analysis, planning, and the efforts of
the guidelines implementing the California Environmental Quality Act, CAL. Pun.
RES. CODE §§ 21000-151 (West Supp. 1972), amending CAL. Pun. RES. CODE§§ 21000-151 (West 1970), to coordinate the two processes see Hagman, supra
note 73, at 48-56. As Professor Hagman notes, coordination is necessary to main.
tain formalized impact assessment procedures based on the National Environmental
Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-27 (1970), from becoming too costly and
too trivial.
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developed by the federal government. States have, to date, focused
their innovations in land use controls on highly vulnerable resources
such as wetlands. But land use plans will soon be required that
classify land on the basis of its ecological carrying capacity and that
specify areas to which development should be channeled. 0 0 This is
planning, of course, but it is not the same as traditional compre-
hensive planningo1l because it involves the allocation of land to pre-
vent imposition of relatively definite external costs. Resolution of
these problems will provide the framework within which courts and,
to a lesser extent, legislatures must struggle with the problem of
deciding the appropriate weight to give previously adopted plans
when reviewing specific zoning changes.
The immediate problem facing the courts, as Fasano indicates, is
integration of prior planning choices into the rationalizaton of the
decision-making process-the second of our basic land use problems.
Examination of the reasons for increased judicial intervention into
the decision-making process provides guidelines for courts in deciding
what weight to give an adopted plan.
The case for increased judicial review of zoning ordinances is based
on the widely accepted need to rationalize existing decision-making
processes. As communities attempt to use zoning to attain more
objectives, 102 they are departing from the limited purposes approved
by the Supreme Court.'03 The resulting use of zoning to advance
100. For useful discussions of a proposal to finance withdrawals and growth
containment programs by transfer of development rights see Costonis, Develop-
ment Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 124-27 (1973)
(discussing problems of coordinating development rights transfer with traditional
comprehensive planning); Note, Development Rights Transfer and Landmark
Preservation-Providing a Sense of Orientation, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 131, 142-58
(1975).
A sophisticated land use plan that rates an area's capacity for development
according to a number of environmental factors, such as the carrying capacity of
the soil, has been prepared for the community of Medford, in southern New
Jersey. CENTER FOR ECOLOGICAL RESEARCH IN PLANNING AND DESIGN, DEP'T OF
LANDSCAPE ARCHITECTURE AND REGIONAL PLANNING, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYL-
VANIA, MEDFORD: PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF
SOCIAL VALUES REPRESENTED BY THE NATURAL ENVIRONMENT OF MEDFORD
TowNSHIP N.J. (1974).
101. Traditional land use planning has always incorporated concepts of with-
drawal such as flood-plain protection.
102. Such objectives include stabilization of the property tax base, design con-
trol, and the reservation of land for senior citizens' retirement colonies.
103. See Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). Al-
though the rationale of Euclid remains unclear, Justice Sutherland's opinion seems
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the general welfare,104 rather than to minimize friction between land
uses, increases the risk that regulations will be adopted that impose
costs on third parties-costs that the prohibited development would
not incur. No accepted basis for imposition of such costs may exist
other than as they relate to promotion of the general welfare. Con-
versely, ability to invoke the presumption of validity means that a
community's substantial costs may be placed upon landowners, without
offsetting community gains, as a result of a zoning change. Both of
these situations are potentially arbitrary; judicial intervention is
proper, at the least, to require that communities more consciously
consider the impacts of their decisions and to limit regulations to
those resting on a generally accepted basis.105
The theoretical basis for this judicial intervention is twofold.
First, local legislative bodies are exercising delegated powers and thus
are not the equivalent of state and national legislatures. Secondly,
to limit the validity of zoning ordinances to the prevention and suppression of
nuisances, with the local legislative body allowed a margin of safety in making its
classifications. See Brief for Alfred Bettman as Amicus Curiae, reprinted in Bett-
man, supra note 25, at 157. The latest Supreme Court opinion seems to rest the
zoning power on enhancement of the general welfare as much as on the suppres-
sion and prevention of nuisances. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. I
(1974), held constitutional a zoning ordinance that restricted occupancy in a single-
family residential area to one or two unrelated individuals or any number of per-
sons related by blood. The narrowness of the Belle Terre facts suggests that the
issue of the limits of the zoning power is still very much open.
104. For an extraordinarily expansive reading of the general welfare as a basis
for exercise of the zoning power see Steel Hill Dev., Inc. v. Town of Sanbornton,
469 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1972), upholding a six acre minimum lot ordinance
when sanitary considerations supported, at most, a three acre minimum.
105. Cf. National Land & Inv. Co. v. Easttown Township Bd. of Adjustment,
419 Pa. 504, 522, 215 A.2d 597, 607 (1965):
While recognizing this presumption [of validity], we must also appreciate
the fact that zoning involves governmental restrictions upon a landowner's
constitutionally guaranteed right to use his property, unfettered, except in very
specific instances, by governmental restrictions. The time must never come
when, because of frustration with concepts foreign to their legal training,
courts abdicate their judicial responsibility to protect the constitutional rights
of individual citizens. Thus, the burden of proof imposed upon one who
challenges the validity of a zoning regulation must never be made so onerous
as to foreclose for all practical purposes, a landowner's avenue of redress
against the infringement of constitutionally protected rights.
The long-standing Pennsylvania policy of grounding the presumption of validity on
adherence to individual initiative, e.g., Appeal of Lord, 368 Pa. 121, 81 A.2d
533 (1951), takes an overly narrow view of a community's police powers. National
Land, however, arguably posits the broader principle that a community owes an
individual some duty to explain the reasons for imposing a restriction on develop-
ment.
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since the concept of zoning contains limitations on a city's choices,
a court can articulate standards to structure local discretion. In
attempting to rationalize the process, courts might use adopted plans
in four situations.
First, a court may wish to recognize the goal of neighborhood
stability, especially in residential areas. A plan creates expectations
that are entitled to some recognition, though doctrines such as the
Maryland change or mistake rule and the Fasano approach are too
rigid. Although a property owner's interest in stability can never
rise to the dignity of an estoppel, a court could properly shift the
burden of justifying departures from the plan that would alter the
anticipated pattern in developed areas where expectations are
stronger.10'3 On the other hand, if the area is undeveloped it would
be proper for a court to conclude that the interests of surrounding
landowners are adequately protected by a site review of the project. 0 7
Secondly, if a city has made a survey, attempted to allocate land
among competing uses based on projected demands, and enacted the
ordinance on the basis of that allocation, the underlying plan ought
to be evidence of the zoning ordinance's reasonableness. 08 "The
adoption of a master plan and the adherence to such a plan is not
in and of itself an abuse of discretion."10J Land reservation, however,
106. See UdelI v. Haas, 21 N.Y.2d 463, 470, 235 N.E.2d 897, 901, 288 N.Y.S.2d
888, 894-95 (1968). In allowing an adjoining landowner to challenge a rezoning
to permit a studio for the television program "Hawaii Five-O" the Supreme
Court of Hawaii stated that "an owner whose property adjoins land subject to
rezoning has a legal interest worthy of judicial recognition should he seek redress
in our courts to preserve the continued enjoyment of his realty by protecting it
from threatening neighborhood change." East Diamond Head Ass'n v. Zoning
Bd. of Appeals, 52 Hawaii 518, 521-22, 479 P.2d 796, 798 (1971).
107. Pennsylvania courts have taken this approach. See Doran Invs. v. Muhlen-
berg Township, 10 Pa. Commw. 143, 309 A.2d 450 (1973) (community cannot
rely on comprehensive plan designation of area for low density to deny planned
unit development application that meets all standards of the ordinance).
108. In affirming denial of a rezoning for a mobile home park in an area
designated for industrial development, the Supreme Court of Kansas wrote,
It is not confiscatory to adopt a plan for land use development and to main-
tain that plan for development in an area where such development is pos-
sible. To abandon such plan for a single project in light of all the circum-
stances presented by the evidence herein is not required. Here abandon-
ment of the plan would create a situation where homes and children would be
placed in an industrial area next to a chemical plant which emitted odors
and discharged chemicals into a stagnant lagoon.
Creten v. Board of County Comn'rs, 204 Kan. 782, 788, 466 P.2d 263, 269 (1970).
109. Fontaine v. Board of County Comm'rs, 493 P.2d 670, 671 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1971).
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is potentially arbitrary and inefficient and must be closely watched.
Beyond challenges on constitutional grounds, 10 courts should allow
a landowner to assert that a reservation is too inflexible. The com-
munity must be able to respond to more pressing needs, such as the
demand for apartments. In some cases courts must require the
municipality to justify the projections upon which the land reserva-
tion was made.'
Thirdly, the converse situation, in which the applicant proposes a
use consistent with the plan and is denied a zoning change, is more
difficult. Because the proposed use is consistent with the plan it could
be argued either that a denial is arbitrary or that the community has
the burden of justifying the denial. The fornier is undesirable on
two grounds: it is not good planning theory because it may lock a
community into an undesirable earlier decision," 2 and it is poor legal
theory because the community must always be capable of using the
police power to adapt to changing conditions. Shifting the burden
could be justified on the ground that adoption of a plan creates
legitimate expectations and that both the applicant and surrounding
landowners have adjusted their behavior, to the greatest extent pos-
110. E.g., Arverne Bay Constr. Co. v. Thatcher, 278 N.Y. 222, 15 N.E.2d
587 (1938), in which a zoning amendment changing property from unrestricted
use to a residential district was held invalid as a substantial taking of land in
violation of the fourteenth amendment when applied to property that could not be
used for residential purposes in the immediate future. Id. at 232-33, 15 N.E.2d
at 592.
111. See United Farm Workers of Florida Housing Project, Inc. v. City of
Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974). In 1972 the City adopted a master
plan that designated a site sought to be used by plaintiff for a low-income housing
project as a park. Plaintiff was denied the necessary zoning permission. The
plan, however, was not followed in two multi-family rezonings for white developers.
On the basis of this and other evidence of discrimination, the court found that
the "city failed to meet its burden of proving that its refusal was necessary to
promote a compelling governmental interest, and thus that the city officials have
deprived the farm workers of equal protection of the law under the fourteenth
amendment." 493 F.2d at 811. Cf. Lefcoe, The Public Housing Referendum
Case, Zoning, and the Supreme Court, 59 CALiF. L. Rlv. 1384 (1971).
112. "To the extent that the plan... is a detailed map of the land indicating
specific uses, it differs hardly at all from the zoning map itself. Under these cir-
cumstances . . . the plan becomes rigid and of little use in dealing with dynamic
community growth." Plager, The Planning Land-Use Control Relationship: A
Look at Some Alternatives, 3 LAND USE CONTROLS Q. 26, 29 (1969). "It is a
matter of common sense and reality that a comprehensive plan is not like the law
of Medes and Persians; it must be subject to reasonable change from time to time
as conditions in the area or township or a large neighborhood change." Furniss
v. Lower Merion Township, 412 Pa. 404, 406, 194 A.2d 926, 927 (1963).
[Vol. 9:69
LAND USE PLANS AS A STANDARD OF REVIEW
sible, on the assumption that the plan will be implemented as adopted.
The situation is different when the plan has been implemented in
a two-stage process-adoption of the plan followed by adoption of a
zoning classification consistent therewith. Since the community has
not applied the plan to any specific tract, expectations are weaker.
A possible solution is to shift the burden of justification and also
adopt a liberal rule on what reasons are relevant in reviewing the
legislative decision. The community should be able to show, not
that conditions have changed or that the plan rests on a mistake,
but simply that it wants to implement a different set of values. 13
113. Cf. Norbeck Village Joint Venture v. Montgomery County Council, 254
Md. 59, 254 A.2d 700 (1969). Pro-planned growth forces ousted a pro-uncon-
trolled development county council in an election. The lame-duck council granted
a number of zoning changes that frustrated the county's policies of confining
growth to wedges and corridors and surrounding satellite communities with green
belts. The higher densities allowed by the lame-duck council were inconsistent
with the previously-adopted master plan. The new council repealed the changes
when it took office. In affirming the repeals, the court noted that the applicants
"did not overcome the strong presumption that the plan was valid legislative
action, a presumption buttressed in this case by reason of the fact that the plan
implemented the General Plan and the Master Plan." Id. at 67, 245 A.2d at
706. Accord, Shapiro v. Montgomery County Council, 269 Md. 380, 306 A.2d
253 (1973). The result should be the same if a community with a high density
non-channeled growth master plan wished to adopt a channeled growth policy and
to implement it through zoning ordinances.
The Washington supreme court is moving in the opposite direction. The court
has combined a rigorous standard of due process with a radical extension of the
prohibition against spot zoning to enforce fidelity to land use plans designed to
preserve high amenity, low density residential areas. In Smith v. Skagit County,
75 Wash. 2d 715, 453 P.2d 832 (1969), a small island completed, after extensive
discussion and planning effort, a comprehensive zoning ordinance designed to keep
its 5,500 acres for residential and recreational uses. Shortly thereafter an alum-
inum company successfully petitioned the planning commission and the board of
county commissioners for a 470 acre industrial use rezoning. The court invalidated
the rezoning on the ground that apparent fairness was lacking, in part, because
the proceedings were hasty compared to the extensive consideration given to the
initial ordinance. Additionally, the court found on the merits that the rezoning
was spot zoning.
In Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d 858, 480 P.2d 489 (1971),
an oil company was more sophisticated but equally unsuccessful. The company
was smart enough to secure its map amendment in a two-stage process; first the
comprehensive plan, which contained a rural-residential projection, was amended
and then the map amendment was granted. The proceedings, however, were held
to lack the appearance of fairness because several members of the planning com-
mission were treated to a trip to Los Angeles to inspect the environmental con-
trols at one of the company's existing refineries. Additionally, spot zoning was
again found. See generally Comment, Zoning Amendments and the Doctrine of
Apparent Fairness, 10 WILLAMETTE L.J. 336 (1974).
The Washington supreme court has, in effect, adopted the Maryland change or
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Interests of the applicant and surrounding landowners in stability
and predictability should not, however, be accorded decisive weight.
Rather the court should recognize that these interests are adequately
considered in the process of reevaluation of community objectives.
Lastly, in some instances a court might decide that the need for a
plan exists and invalidate decisions as ad hoc and arbitrary if sufficient
planning has not been done.114 The essence of zoning is the resolution
of competing demands for the use of space within a particular juris-
diction. Resolution of the competition requires that the decision-
maker consider a reasonable number of claimants, other than the
applicant, for the zoning change and project the impact of alternative
uses on the surrounding area as well as the community as a whole.
If the court is not satisfied that this process was undertaken, it should
hold the change inconsistent with the comprehensive plan and re-
mistake rule and extended it to situations that are arguably not traditional small-
scale piecemeal rezonings but legitimate efforts by communities to respond to
changed conditions. The court is formulating rigid a priori principles to decide
which revisions of a comprehensive plan are and are not in the public interest.
As Chrobuck explained:
[ e start with the premise that comprehensive planning and zoning proposes
and imposes limitations upon free and unhampered use of private as well as
public property, and when such regulations are once enacted, the indiscrimi-
nate amendment, modification or alteration thereof tends to disturb that
degree of stability and continuity in the usage of land to which affected
landowners are entitled to look in the orderly occupation, enjoyment and
development of their properties.
Chrobuck v. Snohomish County, 78 Wash. 2d at 867-68, 480 P.2d at 495. See also
Board of Supervisors of Fairfax County v. Snell Constr. Corp.. ................ Va.
................ 202 S.E.2d 889 (1974).
The Washington doctrine of apparent fairness is an example of a judicially de-
veloped moritoria procedure. The standard of care and ultimately of justification
of the decision which the court has imposed on local planning commissions and
legislative bodies can be justified as a means of restoring public confidence in
local decision-making. "In too many localities . . . neither the procedures for
determining land use nor the individuals making the decisions have the public's
confidence. . . . The decision-making process must be fair not only in fact; it
must also be perceived as fair by the builders, property owners, and others whom
it affects." TAsK FiORCE ON LAND UsE & URBAN GROWTH, supra note 9, at 215-14.
114. This is reasonable since, as Professor Hagman has argued, the crucial
factor is not the existence of a comprehensive plan but a useful information base
for making short-range projections to aid decision-makers. Hagman, supra note
73, at 50.
In environmental litigation it has been argued that when environmental impacts
have been inadequately considered, the decision should be to read the enabling
legislation narrowly and to remand the decision to the legislature for a more
democratic input. Similar theories, developed to justify remands to the agency
involved, seem applicable to judicial review of zoning changes.
[Vol. 9:69
LAND USE PLANS AS A STANDARD OF REVIEW
quire the community to justify the need for departure from a pre-
viously adopted plan.
CONCLUSION
In Golden v. Planning Board"5 Judge Scileppi wrote,
The evolution of more sophisticated efforts to contend with the
increasing complexities of urban and suburban growth has been
met by a corresponding reluctance upon the part of the judiciary
to substitute its judgment as to the plan's over-all effectiveness
for the considered deliberations of its progenitors. . . . Implicit
in such a philosophy of judicial self-restraint is the growing aware-
ness that matters of land use and development are peculiarly
within the expertise of students of city and suburban planning,
and thus well within the legislative prerogative, not lightly to be
impeded .... .
Such reasoning is incorrect. The planning process does not make a
land use decision legitimate. Allocation of land among competing
uses involves difficult value choices that cannot be resolved by rational
processes. Additionally, the impact of planning choices often falls
unevenly on different community groups. Courts must, therefore,
continue to play their traditional role of adjusting the claims of
diverse parties by scrutinizing the reasonableness of local decision-
making. The fact that decisions were made pursuant to a prior plan-
ning process is some evidence of their reasonableness but the weight
to attach to planning is a decision a court must make in light of all
the circumstances.
115. 30 N.Y.2d 359, 285 N.E.2d 291, 334 N.Y.S.2d 138 (1972).
116. Id. at 376-77, 285 N.E.2d at 301, 334 N.Y.S.2d at 150-51.
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